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Abstract
Both the International Criminal Court (icc) and the UN Security Council (unsc) are 
vested with the capacity to request States to freeze individuals’ assets. The two bodies 
are also bound to cooperate closely under the terms of their relationship agreement 
‘with a view to facilitating the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities’. 
This article examines whether this obligation extends to the unsc coordinating its 
targeted sanctions regime to support the icc in respect of the enforcement powers 
with which the latter is equipped. It does so by analysing eight cases where unsc 
action (could) have coincided with icc operations, with a particular focus on the 
(non-)parallel implementation of the two bodies’ asset freezing procedures. The ar-
ticle demonstrates that, though the activities of the unsc and the icc in this sphere 
of their respective operations might have overlapped on a number of occasions, they 
have rarely been deliberately coordinated. This leads the author to conclude that close 
cooperation as envisaged in the relationship agreement between the two bodies is un-
likely on this front.
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1 Introduction
Both the International Criminal Court (icc, Court) and the UN Security Coun-
cil (unsc) are empowered to request States to freeze individuals’ assets. At 
the icc, Article 57(3)(e) of the Court’s constituent instrument, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute),1 permits the 
relevant Pre-Trial Chamber to ‘seek the cooperation of states … to take pro-
tective measures for the purpose of forfeiture’ on condition that a warrant 
of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued against the individual(s) 
targeted by the measures.2 The Pre-Trial Chamber is also required by Ar-
ticle 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute to take into account ‘the strength of the 
evidence and the rights of the parties concerned’ in deciding whether to ask 
States to freeze individuals’ assets.3 The power of the unsc to order States to 
freeze assets finds its legal basis in Chapter vii of the UN Charter, Article 41 
of which permits the organ upon which ‘primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security’4 is conferred to call upon States 
to take action short of the use of armed force to give effect to its decisions.5  
1  icc Statute, Art. 57(3)(e); see also icc Statute, Art. 93(1)(k).
2 icc Statute, Art. 57(3)(e). In order for an arrest warrant or summons to be issued, the icc 
Prosecutor is required to demonstrate the existence of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that 
the person in question has committed one of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. See 
icc Statute, Art. 58(1)(a) (for a warrant of arrest) and Art. 58(7) (for a summons to appear). 
This could be one of the four ‘most serious crimes of concern to the international commu-
nity as a whole’ listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute (genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, or the crime of aggression) or offences against the administration of justice.
3 icc Statute, Art. 57(3)(e). The failure of the Prosecutor to continue to satisfy these important 
criteria has already led to the suspension of one Pre-Trial Chamber order for the freezing of 
assets by an icc Trial Chamber. See icc, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. icc-
01/09-02/11-931, Trial Chamber v(B), Decision on the implementation of the request to freeze 
assets, 8 July 2014, para. 29. For discussion, see Daley J. Birkett, ‘Pre-trial “Protective Measures 
for the Purpose of Forfeiture” at the International Criminal Court: Safeguarding and Balanc-
ing Competing Rights and Interests’, 32(2) Leiden Journal of International Law (2019) 585–602, 
at pp. 589–593.
4 UN Charter, Art. 24.
5 UN Charter, Art. 41. The unsc can only make such requests after determining the existence 
of a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’. See UN Charter, Art. 39. 
Moreover, the unsc, in discharging its duties in terms of maintaining international peace 
and security, ‘shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ 
listed in the first two articles of the UN Charter. See UN Charter, Art. 24(2). Should the body 
‘consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be 
inadequate’, the subsequent provision empowers the unsc to take measures involving the 
use of armed force. See UN Charter, Art. 42.
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A non-exhaustive6 list of measures available to the UN body by virtue of 
 Article 41 of the UN Charter ‘include[s] complete or partial interruption of eco-
nomic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means 
of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’.7 It is pursuant 
to this provision that the unsc’s ‘targeted sanctions’ regime has developed.8 
Among other ‘targeted’ measures, the freezing of individuals’ assets under the 
auspices of specially appointed sanctions committees9 is one of the tools the 
unsc has utilised when discharging its responsibilities under the UN Charter.
Not only have the icc and the unsc been equipped with such asset freezing 
procedures, but the two bodies are also bound to cooperate closely with one 
another by virtue of an agreement. A number of provisions of the Negotiated 
Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the 
United Nations (icc-UN Relationship Agreement) regulate the matter of co-
operation and coordination between the two bodies, with Article 3 containing 
an express obligation for the two international organisations to work together 
in the following terms:
The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a view to facilitating 
the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall co-
operate closely, whenever appropriate, with each other and consult each 
other on matters of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the 
present Agreement and in conformity with the respective provisions of 
the Charter and the Statute.10
This general obligation is therefore qualified insofar as cooperation and coor-
dination are only obligatory when ‘appropriate’ and if conducted in accor-
dance with the two bodies’ respective constituent instruments. As far as the 
freezing of individuals’ assets is concerned, the question might therefore be 
6 The list begins with the words ‘These may …’.
7 UN Charter, Art. 41.
8 According to Biersteker, Tourinho and Eckert, ‘Targeted sanctions differ from comprehen-
sive measures in that they are discriminating policy measures. Rather than being applied 
indiscriminately on an entire country (as comprehensive sanctions are) with resultant 
harmful humanitarian consequences, targeted sanctions are focused on specific individu-
als, entities, sectors, and/or regions of a country’. Thomas J. Biersteker, Marcos Tourinho 
and Sue E. Eckert, ‘Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions’, in Thomas J. Bier-
steker, Sue E. Eckert and Marcos Tourinho (eds.), Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and 
 Effectiveness of United Nations Action (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016) p. 13.
9 Under Rule 28 of the unsc Provisional Rules of Procedure, ‘The Security Council may 
appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question’.
10 icc-UN Relationship Agreement, Art. 3.
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asked whether unsc support for icc measures fulfils these requirements. This 
article aims to answer this question by examining eight situations where 
the two bodies’ activities (could) have coincided, with a particular focus on the 
(non-) parallel implementation of the asset freezing procedures detailed in the 
preceding paragraphs.
Part 2 further examines the breadth of and justifications underpinning the 
obligation of mutual cooperation found in icc-UN Relationship Agreement, 
with a particular focus on how unsc action might strengthen the weak State 
cooperation procedures to which the icc has recourse. Part 3 comprises an 
analysis of eight cases where the unsc (could have) supported the Court by 
exercising its power to request States to freeze assets under Chapter vii of the 
UN Charter. This analysis demonstrates that, though the two bodies’ respective 
activities in this area might have overlapped on a number of occasions, they 
have seldom been coordinated. This, in turn, leads the author to reach the con-
clusion, in Part 4, that to argue in favour of closer, formalised cooperation be-
tween the two asset freezing regimes is aspirational but an unlikely outcome.
2 Incentives to Cooperate
Beyond the general obligation to cooperate closely, the icc-UN Relationship 
Agreement also contains several provisions governing specific areas of cooper-
ation. These provisions regulate matters such as administrative cooperation,11 
cooperation between the unsc and the Court,12 and cooperation between 
the UN and the Court’s Prosecutor.13 But why have these two bodies agreed 
to enter into such an agreement? In other words, why cooperate at all? Paul 
Szasz and Thordis Ingadottir, in evaluating how far general UN-icc coopera-
tion ought to extend, draw attention to multiple relevant factors. These include 
‘the fact that the Court was created under the aegis of the United Nations and 
that the General Assembly and the Secretary-General have repeatedly called 
on states to sign and ratify the Rome Statute’,14 UN involvement in creating 
international(ised) criminal tribunals in response to mass atrocities in the 
11 icc-UN Relationship Agreement, Art. 9.
12 Ibid., Art. 17. Notably, this provision makes no reference to the bodies’ respective asset 
freezing procedures. Nor, however, does the provision specify that the forms of coopera-
tion detailed therein are exhaustive.
13 Ibid., Art. 18.
14 Paul C. Szasz and Thordis Ingadottir, ‘The UN and the icc: The Immunity of the UN and 
Its Officials’, 14 Leiden Journal of International Law (2014) 867, p. 875.
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 former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia,15 and UN 
support for compliance with the applicable rules of international humanitar-
ian law on the part of its peacekeeping forces.16 All of the foregoing consid-
erations inform the authors’ conclusion that ‘full and ready compliance with 
demands made by the Court appears to be completely consistent with the 
general posture of the United Nations’.17 Consequently, despite the de jure and 
de facto independence of the Court from the UN apparatus,18 it has been sug-
gested that the unsc might assist the icc in fulfilling its purposes, not least in 
respect of the Court’s weak cooperation regime.19
At the same time, it has been claimed that the icc, by pursuing its objec-
tives, can support the unsc in realising its goals under the UN Charter; in other 
words, that peace and justice can, and perhaps even ought to, be pursued si-
multaneously.20 For some scholars, there can be ‘no peace without justice’,21 
while others contend that the removal of international criminals, who may 
well constitute obstacles to peace, can serve the interests of both peace and 
justice.22 Still others propose that focusing on individual criminal responsibil-
ity, rather than collective guilt, is able to prevent future conflict.23 Despite 
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., pp. 875–876.
17 Ibid., p. 876.
18 icc-UN Relationship Agreement, preamble (‘in accordance with the Rome Statute, the 
International Criminal Court is established as an independent permanent institution in 
relationship with the United Nations system’).
19 See also Morten Bergsmo, ‘Occasional Remarks on Certain State Concerns about the Juris-
dictional Reach of the International Criminal Court, and Their Possible Implications for 
the Relationship between the Court and the Security Council’, 69 Nordic Journal of Inter-
national Law (2000) 87, p. 110.
20 Ibid., pp. 91–92, 112; Sir Franklin Berman, ‘The Relationship between the International 
Criminal Court and the Security Council’, in Herman von Hebel, Johan G. Lammers and 
Jolien Schukking (eds.), Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour 
of Adriaan Bos (T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 1999) pp. 177–178; Matthias Neuner, ‘The 
Security Council and the icc: Assessing the First Ten Years of Coexistence’, 18 New Eng-
land Journal of International and Comparative Law (2012) 283, pp. 297–298.
21 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over 
Realpolitik’, 35 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2003) 191, p. 204.
22 See Payam Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Fu-
ture Atrocities?’, 95 American Journal of International Law (2001) 7, p. 7; Luigi Condorelli 
and Annalisa Ciampi, ‘Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in 
Darfur to the icc’, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005) 590, p. 592; Payam 
Akhavan, ‘Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace: Reconciling Judi-
cial Romanticism with Political Realism’, 31 Human Rights Quarterly (2009) 624, p. 629.
23 Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment 
of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’, 9 European Journal of International Law 
(1998) 2, p. 9.
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broad consensus that a relationship exists between the maintenance and res-
toration of international peace and security and international criminal 
justice,24 however, tensions between these objectives are also recognised.25
It has been contended that this tension flows from the political character 
of the unsc and the independent judicial position held by the Court, which 
do not neatly converge. In this regard, some scholars argue, on the one hand, 
that the Court must be allowed to act independently of the influence of certain 
States, not least the five permanent members of the unsc,26 lest it be perceived 
as politicised, which could entail negative consequences for both its credibil-
ity and its legitimacy.27 At the same time, others acknowledge that the icc 
must navigate the realities of global politics28 in its day-to-day operations and 
that, in order to fulfil its mandate, the icc may rely upon the exercise of coer-
cive power (military, economic, etc.) by other international actors.29  Robinson 
neatly characterises the foregoing tension as dyadic: ‘[l]egally, the icc is in-
dependent, and indeed its juridical legitimacy hinges on that independence. 
Yet the icc is also, factually, utterly dependent’.30 Consequently, regardless of 
the path chosen by the Court, it will result in seemingly opposite criticisms 
24 See Jens David Ohlin, ‘A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating 
the Rule of Law’, 14 ucla Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs (2009) 77, 
pp. 88–90.
25 Janine Natalya Clark, ‘Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations 
and Possibilities’, 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011) 521, pp. 542–543; Bruce 
Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty 
and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) p. 68.
26 Robert Cryer, ‘Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice’, 19 Leiden Jour-
nal of International Law (2006) 195, p. 206; William A. Schabas, ‘The Banality of Interna-
tional Justice’, 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) 545, p. 550.
27 Lionel Yee, ‘The International Criminal Court and The Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 
16’, in Roy S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: 
Issues, Negotiations, Results (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999) pp. 146–147; 
Lutz Oette, ‘Peace and Justice, or Neither? The Repercussions of the Al-Bashir Case for 
International Criminal Justice in Africa and Beyond’, 8 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2010) 345, pp. 356–358.
28 For a prominent proponent of this view, see Kenneth A. Rodman, ‘Justice as a Dialogue 
Between Law and Politics: Embedding the International Criminal Court within Conflict 
Management and Peacebuilding’, 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) 437, 
p. 439.
29 Ibid., p. 442. See also Kenneth A. Rodman, ‘Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence, 30 
Human Rights Quarterly (2008) 529, p. 530; Kenneth A. Rodman, ‘Is Peace in the Interests 
of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal 
Court’, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law (2009) 99, p. 108.
30 Darryl Robinson, ‘Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win’, 
28 Leiden Journal of International Law (2015) 323, p. 338 (footnote omitted).
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because ‘each side of the dyad is based in values that can be  credibly regarded 
as values underlying international criminal justice’.31 This utter dependence by 
the Court upon other actors is arguably most conspicuous in the context of its 
cooperation procedures, where the icc is particularly reliant on State action.
The cooperation procedures in the Rome Statute are intrinsically weak. Ac-
cording to Antonio Cassese, the framers of the Court’s constituent instrument 
‘left too many loopholes permitting states to delay or even thwart the Court’s 
proceedings’.32 Indeed, the weaknesses in the icc’s enforcement mechanisms 
drew the attention of the international media in June 2015 when the then 
 Sudanese President, Omar Al Bashir, travelled to (and shortly thereafter fled 
from) South Africa, a State Party to the Rome Statute, despite the existence of 
two active warrants of arrest issued against him by the Court’s Prosecutor.33 
The icc is not only inherently reliant on States to arrest accused persons, but 
also to identify, trace, freeze, and/or seize their assets.34
The Court considers its asset freezing powers to be part of a wider system 
of ‘asset recovery’, which entails the preliminary steps of identifying, tracing, 
freezing, and/or seizure of assets.35 The primary theoretical underpinnings 
for the freezing of assets with a view to their eventual forfeiture in most do-
mestic criminal law contexts, that is to say both preventive and restorative 
rationales,36 also manifest themselves in the Rome Statute. Indeed, William 
31 Ibid., p. 330.
32 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Re-
flections’, 10 European Journal of International Law (1999) 144, p. 170. Cassese is particularly 
critical of: (i) the sanctions available in the event of non-cooperation with a request from 
the Court; (ii) in the event of competing requests for surrender or extradition, the failure 
to afford priority to icc-issued requests; and (iii) the modalities of the provision allowing 
States to deny assistance on grounds of national security. See also Göran Sluiter, ‘Obtain-
ing Cooperation from Sudan – Where Is the Law?’, 6 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2008) 871, p. 883.
33 See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, ‘Sudan president Omar al-Bashir leaves South Africa as court 
considers arrest’, The Guardian, 15 June 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/15/
south-africa-to-fight-omar-al-bashirs-arrest-warrant-sudan. All websites were accessed 
on 20 October 2020, unless otherwise mentioned.
34 This is not to say that States not party to the Rome Statute cannot assist the icc; rather, 
they are not bound to do so under its constituent instrument. See icc Statute, Art. 87(5)
(a). For the view that this group of States could be obliged to cooperate under customary 
international law, see Zhu Wenqi, ‘On co-operation by states not party to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court’, 88 International Review of the Red Cross (2006) 87.
35 See icc, Financial Investigations and Recovery of Assets, www.legal-tools.org/doc/ozm1l2, 
p. 5.
36 On which, see, e.g., Peter Alldridge, Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil 
Recovery, Criminal Laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime (Hart Publishing, 
 Oxford, 2003), p. 45 et seq.
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Schabas  describes the purpose behind freezing accused persons’ assets at the 
icc as ‘twofold’:37 ‘First, it facilitates enforcement should the accused person 
be convicted and an order of forfeiture be imposed as part of the sentence. Sec-
ond, freezing of assets is also important in the process of arrest and surrender, 
in that it helps to disrupt support networks of suspects’.38
As far as ‘enforcement’ is concerned, in the Rome Statute system, the Pre-
Trial Chamber can request States to take protective measures for the purpose 
of forfeiture, which include freezing assets ‘in particular for the ultimate ben-
efit of victims’.39 Further, in the event of a conviction, victims’ claims to for-
feited assets are explicitly prioritised above those of all other prospective 
claimants, with Rule 221(2) of the icc Rules of Procedure and Evidence stating 
that: ‘[i]n all cases, when the Presidency decides on the disposition or alloca-
tion of property or assets belonging to the sentenced person, it shall give prior-
ity to the enforcement of measures concerning reparations to victims’.40
The weaknesses in the Court’s cooperation regime can thus have serious im-
plications for its forfeiture powers, pursuant to which fines, forfeiture orders, 
and orders for reparation can be imposed upon persons convicted of crimes 
under its jurisdiction. Scholars have claimed that, should the Trust Fund for 
Victims41 be required to operate with insufficient resources, victims of interna-
tional crimes may be left disappointed and disillusioned with the Court’s repa-
ration framework.42 The significance of this problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that some individuals who commit crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction may 
possess substantial personal wealth.43 Cooperation is  therefore paramount to 
37 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 
(2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016), p. 1320.
38 Ibid.
39 icc Statute, Art. 57(3)(e).
40 icc rpe, Rule 221(2). For analysis of how the Rome Statute governs competing claims for 
frozen assets, see Carla Ferstman, ‘Cooperation and the International Criminal Court: The 
Freezing, Seizing and Transfer of Assets for the Purpose of Reparations’, in Olympia Bekou 
and Daley J. Birkett (eds.), Cooperation and the International Criminal Court: Perspectives 
from Theory and Practice (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2016) pp. 242–244.
41 See icc Statute, Art. 79; Assembly of States Parties, Establishment of a Fund for the Benefit 
of Victims of Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, and of the Families of Such Victims 
(icc-asp/1/Res.6).
42 See Mirjan Damaška, ‘The International Criminal Court between Aspiration and Achieve-
ment’, 14 ucla Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs (2009) 19, p. 31.
43 See, e.g., David Wippman, ‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice’, 
23 Fordham International Law Journal (1999) 473, p. 479 (noting, in discussing the icty, 
that ‘most observers believe that indicted leaders such as Milosevic deliberately fostered 
inter-communal hostility and conflict as a means to secure and maintain political power 
and personal wealth’); Manuel Galvis Martínez, ‘Forfeiture of Assets at the International 
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the effective functioning of the icc reparations system as well as the capacity 
of the Court to enforce orders for fines and forfeiture of assets.
In response to the weaknesses in the icc’s cooperation regime, some 
scholars have suggested that a closer relationship between the Court and the 
unsc might strengthen the enforcement powers at the disposal of the icc.44 
Among the tools available to the unsc, asset freezes and travel bans have 
been suggested as valuable tools for strengthening the enforcement capacity 
of the icc.45 Indeed, not only have the Court and the UN already acknowl-
edged the existence of a relationship between their respective responsibilities, 
particularly in respect of peace and security,46 but the icc-UN Relationship 
Criminal Court: The Short Arm of International Criminal Justice’, 12 Journal of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice (2014) 193, pp. 195–204. Cf. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael 
Reisman, ‘The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court’, 99 American Journal of 
International Law (2005) 385, p. 401; Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims before Interna-
tional Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an icc Trial Judge’, 44 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law (2011) 475, p. 490. On certain perpetrators of interna-
tional crimes as ‘profiteers’, see Alette Smeulers, ‘Perpetrators of International Crimes: 
Towards a Typology’, in Alette Smeulers and Roelof Haveman (eds.), Supranational Crimi-
nology: Towards a Criminology of International Crimes (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2008) 
pp. 249–250; Alette Smeulers and Barbora Holá, ‘icty and the Culpability of Different 
Types of Perpetrators of International Crimes’, in Alette Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence 
and International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Intersentia, Antwerp, 
2010) p. 186.
44 See, e.g., Dan Sarooshi, ‘Aspects of the Relationship between the International Criminal 
Court and the United Nations’, 32 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2001) 27, 
pp. 36–38.
45 See Michael P. Scharf, ‘The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New 
Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal’, 49 DePaul Law Review (2000) 925, 
pp. 944–946; Annie Wartanian, ‘The icc Prosecutor’s Battlefield: Combating Atrocities 
While Fighting for States’ Cooperation: Lessons from the U.N. Tribunals Applied to the 
Case of Uganda’, 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2005) 1289, p. 1307; Marina 
Mancini, ‘UN Sanctions Targeting Individuals and icc Proceedings: How to Achieve a 
Mutually Reinforcing Interaction’, in Natalino Ronzitti (ed.), Coercive Diplomacy, Sanc-
tions and International Law (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2016) p. 228; Nadia Banteka, ‘Mind the 
Gap: A Systematic Approach to the International Criminal Court’s Arrest Warrants En-
forcement Problem’, 49 Cornell International Law Journal (2016) 521, p. 541. See also, on the 
potential use of unsc sanctions to bring an end to grave violations of international hu-
manitarian law committed against children, some of which could constitute war crimes 
under the Rome Statute, David S. Koller and Miriam Eckenfels-Garcia, ‘Using Targeted 
Sanctions to End Violations against Children in Armed Conflict’, 33 Boston University In-
ternational Law Journal (2015) 1, pp. 20–21.
46 See icc-UN Relationship Agreement, preamble (‘Noting the important role assigned to 
the International Criminal Court in dealing with the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole, as referred to in the Rome Statute, and 
which threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’). See also icc, Report of 
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Agreement47 and the Rome Statute48 offer firm legal bases upon which such 
closer cooperation might be built. The following section surveys eight situa-
tions in which the two bodies’ actions (could) have interacted, primarily in 
circumstances related to armed conflict, demonstrating that, despite the unsc 
having had ample opportunity to play an active role in supporting the icc in 
this manner, it has rarely chosen to do so.
3 In Search of Coordination
The icc is not the first international(ised) criminal tribunal49 whose objectives 
and operations have coincided with those of the unsc,50 with the mandates of 
sanctions regimes established by the latter interacting with the activities of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (icty),51 the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,52 the Special Court for Sierra Leone,53 
and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.54 This is hardly unexpected in view of 
the partially overlapping objectives of some international(ised) criminal jus-
tice processes and unsc action briefly discussed in Part 2. Nor it is  startling 
the  International Criminal Court on its Activities in 2014/15 (UN Doc. A/70/350), para. 95 
(‘United Nations targeted sanctions are an important tool for addressing threats to inter-
national peace and security, including atrocity crimes’).
47 icc-UN Relationship Agreement, Art. 3.
48 icc Statute, Art. 87(6) (‘The Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to pro-
vide information or documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation 
and assistance which may be agreed upon with such an organization and which are in 
accordance with its competence or mandate’). See also Rod Rastan, ‘Testing Co-opera-
tion: The International Criminal Court and National Authorities’, 21 Leiden Journal of In-
ternational Law (2008) 431, p. 444.
49 According to Sarah Williams, there is no universally-agreed definition of internation-
alised criminal tribunals, but they do appear to share a number of defining features, in-
cluding ‘a mix of national and international elements in the material jurisdiction of the 
tribunals, or at least that the crimes within the jurisdiction are of concern to the interna-
tional community’. Sarah Williams, Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals: Se-
lected Jurisdictional Issues (Hart, Oxford, 2012) p. 249.
50 See Paul Bentall, ‘United Nations targeted sanctions and other policy tools: diplomacy, 
legal, use of force’, in Biersteker et al. (eds.), supra note 8, pp. 96–97.
51 S/res/724 (1991), para. 5(b), terminated pursuant to S/res/1074 (1996), para. 6.
52 S/res/918 (1994), para. 14, terminated pursuant to S/res/1823 (2008), para. 2.
53 S/res/1521 (2003), para. 21, terminated pursuant to S/res/2288 (2016), para. 2; S/res/1532 
(2004), para. 1. S/res/1521 (2003), para. 1 dissolved the committee established under 
S/res/1343 (2001), para. 14. In turn, S/res/1343 (2001), para. 1 dissolved the committee es-
tablished under S/res/985 (1995), para. 4.
54 S/res/1636 (2005), para. 3(b).
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that the unsc has requested States to give effect to targeted sanctions mea-
sures under Chapter vii of the UN Charter in multiple situations in which the 
icc Prosecutor has also been engaged in investigative activities. This section 
examines eight cases where the respective asset freezing powers with which 
the Court and the unsc are equipped (might) have coincided. One purpose of 
this inquiry is to identify situations in which the request of such measures by 
the UN body has (whether deliberately or incidentally) served to support the 
actions of the Court. A further objective is to draw attention to cases where 
unsc action could have assisted the Court in achieving its objectives, but the 
UN body took no such action. A final goal is to ascertain the reasons behind 
unsc (in)action in each of the two foregoing scenarios. It is beyond the scope 
of the article to scrutinise cases in which the Court has failed to act in sce-
narios in which the unsc has taken coercive action. There have been a number 
of occasions since the entry into force of the Rome Statute in which the UN 
body has called upon UN Member States to freeze individuals’ assets where 
the Court has not been engaged.55 However, in view of the many political ob-
jectives for which targeted sanctions measures have been sought by the unsc 
compared with the comparatively narrow legal basis on which the Court can 
request the execution of such measures,56 it is the view of the present author 
that to conduct such an investigation would be of little value.
3.1 Libya: Coexistent and Coordinated?
The unsc instituted its (second)57 sanctions regime for Libya in Resolution 
1970.58 Targeted sanctions were imposed to respond to the actions of the Lib-
yan Government taken against demonstrators protesting against the regime 
of Muammar Gaddafi (or Qadhafi). As well as imposing measures aimed at 
preventing the supply, sale, or transfer of arms to the Gaddafi regime, a travel 
ban, and asset freezes,59 the unsc also referred the situation in Libya to the 
Prosecutor of the icc.60 In addition, Resolution 1970 established a sanctions 
55 See, e.g., the unsc sanctions regimes for Iran, established under S/res/1737 (2006), termi-
nated pursuant to S/res/2231 (2015), and Guinea-Bissau, established under S/res/2048 
(2012).
56 See discussion infra note 228 and accompanying text.
57 The unsc had previously imposed targeted sanctions in response to the suspected in-
volvement of Libyan Government officials in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and Union 
des transports aériens flight 772. See S/res/748 (1992), paras. 4–6; S/res/883 (1993), paras. 
3–7. The unsc terminated the sanctions regime in September 2003. See S/res/1506 
(2003), paras. 1–2.
58 S/res/1970 (2011), para. 24.
59 Ibid., paras. 9–21.
60 Ibid., paras. 4–8.
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 committee charged with, among other responsibilities, monitoring the execu-
tion of the measures imposed, designating individuals for listing, and consid-
ering exemptions.61 As for the targeted individuals, Muammar Gaddafi and five 
of his children, including his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, became the object of 
assets freezing measures.62 While the travel ban also targeted members of the 
immediate Gaddafi family, senior members of his regime, including Director 
of Military Intelligence, Abdullah Al-Senussi, were also listed.63 Mr Al-Senussi 
was added to the list of individuals subject to an assets freeze in Resolution 
1973,64 in which the unsc also decided to impose financial sanctions on en-
tities.65 The unsc partially relaxed the sanctions imposed by these two reso-
lutions after anti-Gaddafi forces captured the Libyan capital, Tripoli.66 This 
said, the Libya sanctions regime remains in force, having been renewed with a 
particular focus on tackling the illicit export of crude oil from Libya.67 At the 
time of writing, Muammar Gaddafi,68 Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi,69 and Abdullah 
Al-Senussi70 all remain listed, despite the death of Muammar Gadaffi on 20 
October 2011.
After the unsc referred the situation in Libya to the icc in Resolution 1970, 
the Prosecutor successfully applied for the issue of warrants of arrest for three 
individuals in the first instance. Those were: (i) Muammar Mohammed Abu 
61 Ibid., paras. 24–25.
62 Ibid., Annex ii.
63 Ibid., Annex i.
64 S/res/1973 (2011), Annex ii.
65 Ibid.
66 S/res/2009 (2011), paras. 13–19.
67 See S/res/2146 (2014).
68 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning 
Libya, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Qadhafi, www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanc 
tions/1970/materials/summaries/individual/muammar-mohammed-abu-minyar-qad 
hafi (noting, by way of ‘[a]dditional information’, his ‘[r]esponsibility for ordering repres-
sion of demonstrations’ and ‘human rights abuses’).
69 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning 
Libya, Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi, www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/materials/sum 
maries/individual/saif-al-islam-qadhafi (noting, in the ‘[a]dditional information’ catego-
ry, his ‘[c]loseness of association with regime’ and ‘[i]nflammatory public statements en-
couraging violence against demonstrators’).
70 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning 
Libya, Abdullah Al-Senussi, www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/materials/sum 
maries/individual/abdullah-al-senussi (noting, under the heading ‘[a]dditional informa-
tion’, his ‘Military Intelligence involvement in suppression of demonstrations’, ‘suspicion 
of [his] involvement in [the] Abu Selim prison massacre’, and his conviction in absentia 
for the bombing of Union des transports aériens flight 772).
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Minyar Gaddafi;71 (ii) Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi;72 and (iii) Abdullah Al- Senussi.73 
As for their assets, in the words of the then Prosecutor of the Court, Luis 
Moreno Ocampo, speaking after the death of Muammar Gaddafi in November 
2011:
icc Pre-Trial Chamber i has since unsealed arrest warrants for two indi-
viduals in the situation in Libya: (i) for the alleged former Head of the 
Libyan Internal Security Agency, Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled, in April 
201374 and (ii) for an alleged commander in the Al-Saiqa Brigade, one of 
many armed groups involved in the conflict in post-Gaddafi Libya, Mah-
moud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli, in August 201775 and again in July 
2018.76
The coexistent activities of the unsc and the icc with regard to Libya might 
appear to present an ‘appropriate’77 opportunity for the two bodies to coordi-
nate their respective asset freezing powers for mutual benefit. Indeed, there is 
some evidence of coordination in this situation, where the unsc listed two 
individuals, Muammar Gaddafi and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, later subject to icc 
arrest warrants in the same resolution as that which referred the situation in 
Libya to the Court under Article 13(b) icc Statute, with a third, Abdullah Al-
Senussi, following less than one month thereafter. Bentall describes the re-
sponses of the UN organ and the icc to events in Libya, as ‘reinforcing’, arguing 
that ‘[t]he judicial processes and targeted sanctions pulled logically in the 
same direction in isolating the Qadhafi regime’.78 Larissa van den Herik offers 
a plausible reason behind the unsc’s reinforcement of the icc in the situation 
71 icc, Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. icc-01/11-01/11-2, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Warrant of Arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, 27 June 
2011.
72 icc, Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. icc-01/11-01/11-3, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Warrant of Arrest for Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, 27 June 2011.
73 icc, Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. icc-01/11-01/11-4, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Warrant of Arrest for Abdullah Al-Senussi, 27 June 2011.
74 icc, Prosecutor v. Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled, Case No. icc-01/11-01/13-1, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Warrant of Arrest for Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled with under seal and ex parte 
Annex, 18 April 2013.
75 icc, Prosecutor v. Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli, Case No. icc-01/11-01/17-2, 
 Pre-Trial Chamber i, Warrant of Arrest, 15 August 2017.
76 icc, Prosecutor v. Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli, Case No. icc-01/11-01/17-13, 
 Pre-Trial Chamber i, Second Warrant of Arrest, 4 July 2018.
77 icc-UN Relationship Agreement, Art. 3.
78 Bentall, supra note 52, p. 98.
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in Libya, namely the unanimity of the UN body in referring the situation in 
Libya to the Court.79
In 2014, Australia, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Sweden sponsored a proj-
ect studying how to revise and improve the implementation of unsc sanc-
tions.80 This project culminated in the publication of the Compendium of the 
High-level Review of United Nations Sanctions in June 2015.81 Among the rec-
ommendations put forward in the Compendium are several directed at the 
relationship between targeted sanctions and international(ised) criminal jus-
tice institutions.82 Recommendation 100 resembles the pattern observed with 
regard to the 2011 situation in Libya:
With the icc as an example, sanctions committees should consider en-
abling the automatic listing of persons sought by the Court once a war-
rant for their arrest has been issued by a Pre-Trial Chamber for the alleged 
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, particularly 
where the situation has been referred by the Security Council itself.83
Yet, as this article will demonstrate in the following sections, practical support 
for the Court by sanctions committees has very much constituted the excep-
tion rather than the rule.
3.2 Coexistent but Uncoordinated
3.2.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo
The unsc established a sanctions regime for the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (drc) in Resolution 1493.84 The first measures taken in this context were 
not targeted at individuals, but consisted of an arms embargo against a number 
of armed groups operating in the North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri  regions.85 
79 Larissa van den Herik, ‘The Individualization of Enforcement in International Law: 
 Exploring the Interplay between United Nations Targeted Sanctions and International 
Criminal Proceedings’, in Tiyanjana Maluwa, Max du Plessis and Dire Tladi (eds.), The 
Pursuit of a Brave New World in International Law: Essays in Honour of John Dugard (Brill 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2017) p. 244.
80 Letter dated 12 June 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of Australia, Finland, Germa-
ny, Greece and Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (UN Doc. 
A/69/941–S/2015/432).
81 Ibid., Annex.
82 Ibid., pp. 57–59.
83 Ibid., p. 59.
84 S/res/1493 (2004), para. 20.
85 Ibid.
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This reflects the objectives pursued by the measures, which  primarily related 
to the armed conflict in the region.86 It was not until March 2004 that a sanc-
tions committee, with the power, inter alia, to monitor violations of the arms 
embargo, was established.87 In a further resolution, adopted in May 2005,88 the 
unsc extended the arms embargo across the drc.89 In the same resolution, 
the UN organ decided that UN Member States should enforce a travel ban and 
an asset freeze against ‘all persons designated by the Committee as acting in 
violation of ’ the broadened arms embargo.90 These measures were extended 
to target the political and military leadership of foreign armed factions operat-
ing in drc territory and the leaders of Congolese militias in receipt of foreign 
support.91 The unsc decided upon a further extension of the sanctions in July 
2006, on this occasion targeting:
– Political and military leaders recruiting or using children in armed conflict 
in violation of applicable international law; [and]
– Individuals committing serious violations of international law involving the 
targeting of children in situations of armed conflict, including killing and 
maiming, sexual violence, abduction and forced displacement[.]92
The UN body has renewed (and revised) the measures in a series of subsequent 
resolutions.93 It was pursuant to the foregoing targeted sanctions that a num-
ber of Congolese nationals who later also became the object of icc-issued ar-
rest warrants were listed by the Resolution 1533 Sanctions Committee.
It was the President of the drc who referred the situation on Congolese ter-
ritory to the icc’s Prosecutor.94 Having determined that the criteria enabling 
the initiation of an investigation, including that ‘[t]he information available to 
the Prosecutor provide[d] a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the 
86 Ibid., preamble; paras 13–14.
87 S/res/1533 (2004), para. 8.
88 S/res/1596 (2005).
89 Ibid., para. 1.
90 Ibid., paras. 13–16.
91 S/res/1649 (2005), para. 2.
92 S/res/1698 (2006), para. 13.
93 S/res/1768 (2007); S/res/1771 (2007); S/res/1799 (2008); S/res/1804 (2008); S/res/1857 
(2008); S/res/1896 (2009); S/res/1952 (2010); S/res/2021 (2011); S/res/2078 (2012); 
S/res/2136 (2014); S/res/2198 (2015); S/res/2293 (2016); S/res/2360 (2017); S/res/2424 
(2018); S/res/2478 (2019).
94 Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (icc-otp-20040419-50), www.legal-tools.org/doc/520b63.
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jurisdiction of the Court ha[d] been or [was] being committed’,95 were met,96 
the Prosecutor informed the Court’s Presidency, which assigned the Situation 
in the drc to icc Pre-Trial Chamber i.97 Within this Situation, the Prosecutor 
successfully sought warrants of arrest for multiple individuals, all of whom 
have also been listed by the Sanctions Committee established by the unsc 
pursuant to Resolution 1533.
3.2.1.1 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
The drc Sanctions Committee listed Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the then leader 
of a Congolese militia, Union des Patriotes Congolais (Union of Congolese Pa-
triots or upc), on 1 November 2005 for contravening the arms embargo.98 The 
narrative summary of reasons99 for the listing of Mr Lubanga provided by the 
Committee also notes his involvement in the ‘recruitment and use of children 
in Ituri in 2002 to 2003’ under the heading ‘[a]dditional information’.100 This 
said, the sole ‘[r]eason’ for his listing is limited to violations of the measures 
concerning the movement of arms established in Resolution 1493.101
As for his icc arrest warrant, Pre-Trial Chamber i found that there were 
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that Mr Lubanga was criminally responsible 
under the Rome Statute for three war crimes, namely enlisting and conscript-
ing children under the age of fifteen and using children under the same age to 
participate actively in hostilities.102 It was for this reason, among others, that 
the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant for Mr Lubanga’s arrest. After the issu-
ance of an arrest warrant, in accordance with Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Stat-
ute, the Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the Registry of the Court to transmit re-
quests for cooperation from States with a view to identifying, tracing, freezing, 
95 icc Statute, Art. 53(1)(a).
96 icc, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. icc-01/04-1, Presidency, 
Decision assigning the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, 5 July 2005.
97 Ibid.
98 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Thomas Lubanga, www.un.org/securitycouncil/
sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/thomas-lubanga.
99 Ibid. ‘In accordance with paragraph 2 (g) of the Guidelines for the conduct of its work, the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons 




102 icc, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. icc-01/04-01/06-2-tEN, Pre-Trial 
Chamber i, Warrant of Arrest, 10 February 2006, p. 4.
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and seizing Mr Lubanga’s property and assets.103 In terms of specific assets 
targeted, Pre-Trial Chamber i’s request to the drc refers to information from 
the Prosecutor, according to which Mr Lubanga possessed houses in Bunia and 
Goma as well as a vehicle in the latter.104 The Prosecutor also indicated that 
‘funds from a local airline might in fact belong to Mr Lubanga’.105 Notable for 
the purposes of the present analysis, in each of the two requests for coopera-
tion issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber (i.e. one directed at the drc and the sec-
ond aimed at other States Parties to the Rome Statute), explicit reference was 
made to Mr Lubanga’s listing by the Sanctions Committee established by the 
unsc in Resolution 1533, as follows:
CONSIDERING that paragraph 15 of United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1596, states that “… all States shall … immediately freeze 
the  funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on 
their territories from the date of adoption of this resolution, which are 
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by persons designated by the 
[Sanctions] Committee pursuant to paragraph 13 above, or that are held 
by entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any persons act-
ing on their behalf or at their direction …”;
CONSIDERING that the “List of individuals and entities subject to the 
measures imposed by Paragraphs 13 and 15 of Security Council resolution 
1596 (2005)”, in which the Sanctions Committee identifies Mr Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo as one of the persons concerned by the said resolution[.]106
103 icc, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. icc-01/04-01/06-22-tEN, Pre-Trial 
Chamber i, Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtain-
ing the identification, tracing, freezing and seizure of property and assets belonging to 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 9 March 2006; icc, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case 
No. icc-01/04-01/06-62-tEN, Pre-Trial Chamber i, Request to States Parties to the Rome 
Statute for the Identification, Tracing and Freezing or Seizure of the Property and Assets 
of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 31 March 2006. See also icc, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Case No. icc-01/04-01/06-1-Corr-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber i, Decision on the Prosecu-
tor’s Application for a warrant of arrest, Article 58, 10 February 2006, p. 64.
104 icc, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. icc-01/04-01/06-22-tEN, Pre-Trial 
Chamber i, Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtain-
ing the identification, tracing, freezing and seizure of property and assets belonging to 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 9 March 2006, p. 3.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid. See also icc, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. icc-01/04-01/06-62-tEN, 
Pre-Trial Chamber i, Request to States Parties to the Rome Statute for the Identification, 
Tracing and Freezing or Seizure of the Property and Assets of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
31 March 2006, p. 3.
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Prima facie, the respective asset freezing measures adopted by the drc 
Sanctions Committee and the Court with respect to Mr Lubanga might appear 
to indicate concerted action. However, as Annalisa Ciampi contends, ‘[t]he 
ground which justifies the listing [by the drc Sanctions Committee] … has 
little, if anything, to do with the crimes within the jurisdiction of the icc for 
which Lubanga [was] charged’.107 Paul Bentall reaches a similar conclusion, 
namely that the execution of targeted sanctions against Mr Lubanga under the 
UN Charter shortly before the icc issued a warrant for his arrest was 
‘coincidental’,108 rather than coordinated. Bentall references the fact that the 
unsc did not refer the situation in the drc to the Court in accordance with 
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute as further evidence in support of this argu-
ment.109 It is difficult to dispute these conclusions. Mr Lubanga’s listing by the 
drc Sanctions Committee (despite overtly recognising his participation in 
the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict) was for violations of the 
arms embargo, while the icc issued a warrant for his arrest for enlisting, con-
scripting, and using child soldiers. Accordingly, though the icc referred to Mr 
Lubanga’s listing by the drc Sanctions Committee in requesting the drc and 
other States Parties to its constituent instrument to freeze his assets, it is a 
stretch to describe the respective action of the two bodies here as coordinated. 
As will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, similar conclusions can 
be reached with regard to numerous other drc-based individuals subject to 
parallel, if not coordinated, asset freezing requests from the unsc and the icc.
3.2.1.2 Germain Katanga
On the same day that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was added to the list of targeted 
individuals, the drc Sanctions Committee listed Germain Katanga, a com-
mander in the Force de résistance patriotique d’Ituri (Front for Patriotic Resis-
tance in Ituri or frpi), a Congolese armed group, for breaching the arms 
 embargo.110 Again, similar to the listing of Mr Lubanga, the Sanctions Commit-
tee notes Mr Katanga’s involvement in recruiting and using children in Ituri 
between 2002 and 2003 in the ‘[a]dditional information’ category.111
107 Annalisa Ciampi, ‘Security Council Targeted Sanctions and Human Rights’, in Bardo Fass-
bender (ed.), Securing Human Rights? Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security 
Council (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) p. 136.
108 Bentall, supra note 52, pp. 97–98.
109 Ibid., p. 97.
110 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Germain Katanga, www.un.org/securitycouncil/
sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/germain-katanga.
111 Ibid.
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Turning to the icc, Pre-Trial Chamber i issued a warrant of arrest for 
Mr Katanga on 2 July 2007.112 The warrant listed multiple allegations of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.113 After the warrant had been issued, Pre-
Trial Chamber i requested cooperation from States in the identification, trac-
ing, freezing, or seizure of Mr Katanga’s property and assets, ‘including his 
moveable and immovable property, bank accounts, [and] shares in a partner-
ship, business or private company’.114 In a further order on the execution of the 
arrest warrant, the same Pre-Trial Chamber took note of information supplied 
by the Prosecutor that, at the time the crimes contained in his application for 
a warrant were allegedly committed, Mr Katanga ‘reportedly had two residenc-
es in Aveba [and] that he also can be expected to have retained at least some 
of the fruits of the crimes in which his combatants frequently engaged’.115 Pre-
Trial Chamber i also decided that the icc’s Registrar ought to transmit a re-
quest for cooperation to the drc with respect to Mr Katanga’s assets,116 having 
referenced ‘resolution 1596 (2005) and the list of persons and entities which 
are subject to measures imposed by paragraphs 13 and 15 of the resolution’.117 In 
this request for cooperation, as with the cooperation requests transmitted to 
the drc and other States Parties to the Rome Statute with respect to Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo’s assets,118 the Registrar overtly mentioned the inclusion of 
Mr Katanga on the drc Sanctions Committee’s list of targeted individuals.119 
The wording used is identical to that contained in the request issued to the 
112 icc, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. icc-01/04-01/07-1-tENG, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, 2 July 2007.
113 Ibid., p. 6 (listing the crimes against humanity of murder, other inhumane acts, and sexual 
slavery and the war crimes of wilful killing, inhuman treatment, using children under the 
age of fifteen years to participate actively in hostilities, sexual slavery, intentionally direct-
ing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not tak-
ing direct part in hostilities, and pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault).
114 icc, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. icc-01/04-01/07-7-tENG, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtaining the 
identification, tracing, freezing and seizure of the property and assets of Germain Ka-
tanga, 6 July 2007, p. 3.
115 icc, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. icc-01/04-01/07-54-tENG, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Order on the execution of the warrant of arrest against Germain Katanga, 5 Novem-
ber 2007, p. 5.
116 Ibid., p. 8.
117 Ibid., p. 3.
118 See supra note 109.
119 icc, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. icc-01/04-01/07-7-tENG, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtaining the 
identification, tracing, freezing and seizure of the property and assets of Germain Ka-
tanga, 6 July 2007, p. 2.
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drc by Pre-Trial Chamber i in respect of Mr Lubanga’s assets, but for naming 
Mr Katanga rather than Mr Lubanga as an individual targeted by the unsc’s 
targeted sanctions measures.120
3.2.1.3 Bosco Ntaganda
The Sanctions Committee also added Bosco Ntaganda, a upc military com-
mander, to the list of targeted individuals on 1 November 2005.121 As with 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain Katanga, Mr Ntaganda was listed for vio-
lating the arms embargo,122 while his involvement in the recruitment and use 
of children in the armed conflicts in Ituri and North Kivu is mentioned by way 
of ‘[a]dditional information’.123
icc Pre-Trial Chamber i issued an arrest warrant for Mr Ntaganda on 7 
 August 2006.124 The crimes for which, in the opinion of the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that Mr Ntaganda was criminally 
liable were enlistment and conscription of children under the age of fifteen 
and use of children under fifteen to participate actively in hostilities,125 all war 
crimes under Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute.126 As for Mr Ntaganda’s property 
and assets, in evaluating the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest,127 
Pre-Trial Chamber i requested that the Court’s Registry prepare (and transmit) 
requests for cooperation from the drc,128 Uganda,129 and Rwanda.130 Pre-Trial 
Chamber i made this request so that these States might ‘identify, trace and 
freeze or seize the property and assets belonging to Bosco  Ntaganda at the 
120 Ibid.
121 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosco Taganda, www.un.org/securitycouncil/
sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/bosco-taganda.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid. (‘According to the Office of the [Special Representative of the Secretary-General] on 
Children and Armed Conflict, he was responsible for recruitment and use of children in 
Ituri in 2002 and 2003, and 155 cases of direct and/or command responsibility for recruit-
ment and use of children in North Kivu from 2002 to 2009’).
124 icc, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. icc-01/04-02/06-2-Anx-tEN, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Warrant of Arrest, 22 August 2006.
125 Ibid., p. 4.
126 Rome Statute, supra note 2, Art. 8(2).
127 icc, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. icc-01/04-02/06-1-Red-tENG, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Decision on the Prosecution Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 6 March 2007.
128 Ibid., p. 35; see also para. 87.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid., p. 36; see also para. 87.
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 earliest opportunity, without prejudice to the rights of third parties’,131 despite 
the icc Prosecutor having made ‘no application to this effect’.132
It is noticeable that, unlike with Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain 
 Katanga, no mention is made of Mr Ntaganda’s pre-existing place on the drc 
sanctions list, at least not in documents that are publicly available and/or 
 unredacted. This could be seen as an indication that the icc abandoned its 
strategy of explicitly referencing an individual’s listing by the Resolution 1533 
Sanctions Committee when requesting cooperation from States in the freezing 
of assets. This, in turn, could be viewed as a decline in the already minimal 
level of coordination between the unsc and the icc in this sphere of their 
respective operations.
3.2.1.4 Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui
Another individual added to the drc sanctions list on 1 November 2005 is 
frpi commander Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui.133 Similar to his fellow frpi leader, 
Germain Katanga, Mr Ngudjolo was listed for flouting the arms embargo.134 
As with the three foregoing listees, the Sanctions Committee remarked upon 
Mr Ngudjolo’s use of children in armed conflict, this time in Ituri in 2006, 
 under the heading ‘[a]dditional information’.135
The Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber i issued a warrant of arrest for Mr Ngudjolo 
shortly after that of his frpi colleague, Germain Katanga.136 The warrants also 
shared similarities with respect to the crimes contained therein.137 On 14 No-
vember 2007, the Registrar transmitted a request for cooperation from the drc 
with a view to identifying, tracing, freezing, and/or seizing Mr Ngudjolo’s prop-
erty and assets138 in accordance with an order by Pre-Trial Chamber i to this 
131 Ibid., pp. 35, 36.
132 Ibid., para. 88.
133 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning 




136 icc, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. icc-01/04-01/07-260-tENG, Pre-Trial 
Chamber i, Warrant of Arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 6 July 2007.
137 Ibid., p. 6 (listing the crimes against humanity of murder, other inhumane acts, and sexual 
slavery and the war crimes of wilful killing, inhuman treatment, using children under the 
age of fifteen years to participate actively in hostilities, sexual slavery, intentionally direct-
ing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not tak-
ing direct part in hostilities, and pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault).
138 icc, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. icc-01/04-01/07-266, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Demande adressée à la république démocratique du Congo en vue d’obtenir 
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effect.139 The order on the execution of the warrant of arrest for Mr Ngudjolo140 
also resembles that of Germain Katanga. For the purposes of the present analy-
sis, it is notable that Pre-Trial Chamber i took note of unsc Resolution 1596 
(2005) and the list of persons and entities targeted by measures imposed by 
paragraphs 13 and 15 thereof.141 As for specific assets identified as belonging to 
Mr Ngudjolo, the same Pre-Trial Chamber noted information provided by the 
Prosecutor that Mr Ngudjolo allegedly had a residence in Ituri at the time of 
the events covered by the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest, and 
that he retained part of the proceeds of the crimes in which his troops regu-
larly engaged.142
It is important to observe at this stage that the Court’s Trial Chamber ii ac-
quitted Mr Ngudjolo on 18 December 2012,143 with the Appeals Chamber up-
holding this decision on 27 February 2015.144 Neither of these icc decisions led 
to Mr Ngudjolo’s de-listing by the drc Sanctions Committee. On the contrary, 
he remains a designated individual at the time of writing, that is to say more 
than six years after his acquittal at trial. Might the lack of effect on the part of 
the Court’s decision on Mr Ngudjolo’s continued presence on the drc sanc-
tions list indicate an absence of coordination between the two asset freezing 
processes under examination? Larissa van den Herik offers another possible 
explanation, namely that ‘individuals can be listed and subjected to UN sanc-
tions for different reasons than those underlying icc prosecutions’.145 It has 
been shown that Mr Ngudjolo, like Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katan-
ga, and Bosco Ntaganda, found himself on the sanctions list for violating the 
arms embargo. As van den Herik contends: ‘most listings are grounded on an 
l’identification, la localisation, le gel et la saisie des biens et avoirs de Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui [Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose of obtaining the 
identification, tracing, freezing and seizure of the property and assets of Mathieu Ngud-
jolo Chui], 14 November 2007.
139 Ibid., p. 2.
140 icc, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. icc-01/04-01/07-294, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i, Version Publique Expurgée de l’ « Ordonnance relative à l’exécution du mandat 
d’arrêt à l’encontre de Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui » rendue le 6 juillet 2007 [Public redacted 
version of the “Order on the execution of the warrant of arrest against Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui” issued on 6 July 2007], 21 February 2008.
141 Ibid., p. 2.
142 Ibid., p. 5.
143 icc, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. icc-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, Trial Cham-
ber ii, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 18 December 2012.
144 icc, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. icc-01/04-02/12-271-Corr, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber ii 
entitled “Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute”, 27 February 2015.
145 van den Herik, supra note 82, p. 249.
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 individual’s contribution to obstructing the peace process and such a reason 
may maintain or even increase in validity upon return of an acquitted person, 
thus potentially justifying the continuation of the listing’146 Such a conclusion 
would appear to be more than reasonable when scrutinising the cases of the 
individuals subject to financial sanctions implemented under the auspices of 
the unsc and icc proceedings in the drc context. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, whether an individual designated by a unsc-established sanctions com-
mittee for alleged violations of international humanitarian law and acquitted 
of those same violations by the icc would find themselves delisted at the UN 
level following their acquittal. In view of the state of sanctions committee 
practice as far as the delisting of individuals (and entities) is concerned at the 
time of writing,147 the present author doubts whether this would be the case.
3.2.1.5 Callixte Mbarushimana
The Sanctions Committee established in Resolution 1533 listed Callixte 
Mbarushimana, who allegedly had a senior role in the Forces démocratiques de 
libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda or 
fdlr), an armed militia active in the eastern drc, on 3 March 2009.148 Accord-
ing to the Sanctions Committee, Mr Mbarushimana was targeted by individual 
sanctions because ‘he impeded the disarmament and the voluntary repatria-
tion and resettlement of combatants’ in contravention of paragraph 4 of Reso-
lution 1857.149
icc Pre-Trial Chamber i issued a warrant of arrest for Callixte Mbarushi-
mana on 28 September 2010.150 The arrest warrant contained a list of 11 crimes 
under the Court’s jurisdiction for which Pre-Trial Chamber i was satisfied to 
the required standard that Mr Mbarushimana was responsible.151 However, 
146 Ibid.
147 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. On entities, see Dini Sejko and Daley J. 
Birkett, ‘When United Nations Sanctions Impact International Financial Governance: 
Lessons from the Libyan Sovereign Wealth Fund’ 34 American University International 
Law Review (2018) 387, pp. 420–425.
148 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Callixte Mbarushimana, www.un.org/security 
council/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/callixte-mbarushimana.
149 Ibid.
150 icc, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. icc-01/04-01/10-2-tENG, Pre-Trial 
Chamber i, Warrant of Arrest for Callixte Mbarushimana, 28 September 2020.
151 Ibid., para. 10 (listing the crimes against humanity of murder, torture, rape, other inhu-
mane acts, and persecution and the war crimes of attacks against the civilian population, 
destruction of property, murder, torture, rape, and inhuman treatment).
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unlike in certain earlier decisions on applications for arrest warrants, the 
 Pre-Trial Chamber made no mention of Mr Mbarushimana’s assets.152 Nor, 
to the best of the present author’s knowledge, was any such mention made 
in later publicly available filings. Similar to the situation with Mathieu Ngud-
jolo Chui,153 despite the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber i declining to confirm the 
charges154 against Mr Mbarushimana on 16 December 2011,155 and with the Ap-
peals Chamber having unanimously dismissed the Prosecutor’s appeal against 
this decision on 30 May 2012,156 his name remains on the list of designated 
individuals. There is therefore limited evidence of coordinated action between 
the two bodies in this case. A similar conclusion can be reached with regard to 
Sylvestre Mudacumura.
3.2.1.6 Sylvestre Mudacumura
The drc Sanctions Committee listed Sylvestre Mudacumura, the alleged com-
mander of the fdlr-affiliated Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi, on 1 Novem-
ber 2005 for trafficking arms in violation of the embargo.157 The Committee 
also mentions information from the Office of the Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict as regards Mr Mudacu-
mura’s responsibility for ‘27 cases of recruitment and use of children by troops 
under his command in North Kivu from 2002 to 2007’ in the ‘[a]dditional infor-
mation’ category.158
icc Pre-Trial Chamber ii issued an arrest warrant for Sylvestre Mudacumu-
ra on 13 July 2012.159 The warrant specified multiple war crimes for which the 
Pre-Trial Chamber was satisfied that there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ 
152 icc, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. icc-01/04-01/10-7, Pre-Trial Chamber i, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest for Callixte Mbarushi-
mana, 28 September 2010.
153 van den Herik, supra note 82, p. 249.
154 icc Statute, Art. 61.
155 icc, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. icc-01/04-01/10-465-Red, Pre-Trial 
Chamber i, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 16 December 2011.
156 icc, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. icc-01/04-01/10-514, Appeals Cham-
ber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber i 
of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the confirmation of charges”, 30 May 2012.
157 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sylvestre Mudacumura, www.un.org/security-
council/sanctions/1533/materials/summaries/individual/sylvestre-mudacumura.
158 Ibid.
159 icc, Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura, Case No. icc-01/04-01/12-1-Red, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber ii, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, 13 July 2012, para. 77
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that Mr Mudacumura was criminally responsible.160 In a similar manner to 
Pre-Trial Chamber i’s decision on the arrest warrant for Callixte Mbarushima-
na, Pre-Trial Chamber ii made no mention of Mr Mudacumura’s assets, at least 
not in the unredacted paragraphs of the decision. At the same time, while the 
Pre-Trial Chamber did not refer to the asset freeze measures imposed against 
Mr Mudacumura pursuant to his listing by the Sanctions Committee (again, in 
the unredacted parts of the decision), the Chamber did order the Court’s Reg-
istrar to take steps to request an exemption from the travel ban imposed by the 
same listing.161
3.2.2 Côte d’Ivoire
The unsc first imposed targeted sanctions against individuals and entities in 
Côte d’Ivoire in November 2004. Acting pursuant to Chapter vii of the UN 
Charter, and in accordance with Rule 28 of its Provisional Rules of Procedure,162 
the UN organ instituted a sanctions committee in Resolution 1572.163 The sanc-
tions regime for Côte d’Ivoire aimed to respond to renewed fighting in contra-
vention of a ceasefire agreement brokered following the disputed 2000 Ivorian 
presidential election, of which Laurent Gbagbo was the victor and which Ales-
sane Ouattara, among other opposition candidates, was excluded from con-
testing. As for the sanctions requested, Resolution 1572 includes an arms 
embargo,164 a travel ban,165 and asset freezing measures.166 Thirteen months 
later, having determined that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued ‘to pose 
a threat to international peace and security in the region’,167 the unsc decided 
to renew the sanctions imposed by Resolution 1572 for an additional year.168 
Further measures were adopted in the aftermath of the disputed presidential 
160 Ibid., pp. 28-29 (listing the war crimes of murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, 
outrage upon personal dignity, attack against the civilian population, pillaging, rape, and 
destruction of property).
161 Ibid., p. 30 (‘Orders the Registrar […] to liaise with the Prosecutor in order to invite the 
drc and the Kingdom of The Netherlands to request an exemption from the travel ban 
imposed by the UN Security Council and the Council of the European Union to allow the 
surrender of Sylvestre Mudacumura to the Court and to enter the territory of the The 
Netherlands’).
162 See supra note 10.
163 S/res/1572 (2004), para. 14.
164 Ibid., para. 7.
165 Ibid., para. 9.
166 Ibid., para. 11.
167 S/res/1643 (2005), preamble.
168 Ibid., para. 11.
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election of 2010, the result of which, a victory for Mr Ouattara, Mr Gbagbo re-
fused to accept. Having implored ‘all the Ivorian parties and stakeholders to 
respect the will of the people and the outcome of the election’ in Resolution 
1962,169 in view of Mr Gbagbo’s continued refusal to do so,170 the unsc  adopted 
further individual sanctions measures targeting Mr Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo 
(his wife), and three prominent supporters of his regime.171 The unsc renewed 
and modified the measures on a number of occasions172 before terminating 
the sanctions regime for Côte d’Ivoire in Resolution 2283 of 28 April 2016.173
The governments led by Mr Gbagbo and Mr Ouattara, respectively, granted 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Côte d’Ivoire to the Court. On 18 April 
2003, Mr Gbagbo’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mamadou Bamba, submitted a 
declaration, with validity ‘for an unspecified period of time’ from 19 September 
2002,174 under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute.175 This provision allows States 
not party to the icc’s constituent instrument to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court on an ad hoc basis.176 Following the 2010 presidential election, Mr Ouat-
tara sent a letter addressed to the icc’s President, Prosecutor, and Registrar in 
which he confirmed the declaration of 18 April 2003.177 In a further letter to the 
icc Prosecutor on 3 May 2011, Mr Ouattara explicitly requested an icc investi-
gation into crimes committed on Ivorian territory, emphasised Côte d’Ivoire’s 
readiness to cooperate with the Court, and confirmed his intention that Côte 
d’Ivoire become a State party to the Rome Statute ‘as soon as practicable’.178 
It was pursuant to the ad hoc declaration that the Prosecutor sought authori-
sation from the Pre-Trial Chamber to commence an investigation into the 
169 S/res/1962 (2010), para. 1.
170 S/res/1975 (2011), para. 3.
171 Ibid., para. 12, Annex (listing, in addition to Laurent and Simone Gbagbo, Désiré Tagro, 
Pascal Affi N’Guessan, and Alcide Djédjé).
172 S/res/1980 (2011); S/res/2045 (2012); S/res/2101 (2013); S/res/2153 (2014); S/res/2219 
(2015).
173 S/res/2283 (2016), para. 1.
174 icc, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. icc-02/11-01/11-129-Anx16-tENG, Declaration 
Accepting the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court dated 18 April 2003, 6 Sep-
tember 2012.
175 icc Statute, Art. 12(3).
176 Ibid. (‘… [A] State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall 
cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9’).
177 icc, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. icc-02/11-01/11-129-Anx14-tENG, Letter from 
Alassane Ouattara to the President of the icc dated 14 December 2010, 9 October 2012.
178 icc, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. icc-02/11-01/11-129-Anx15-tENG, Letter from 
Alassane Ouattara to the Prosecutor of the icc dated 3 May 2011, 10 October 2012.
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 situation in Côte d’Ivoire,179 a request granted by icc Pre-Trial Chamber iii on 
15 November 2011.180 Three individuals sanctioned by the Côte d’Ivoire Sanc-
tions Committee thereafter became the object of icc arrest warrants.
3.2.2.1 Charles Blé Goudé
Charles Blé Goudé was among three individuals designated by the Resolution 
1572 Sanctions Committee in February 2006.181 In addition to his leadership of 
the Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes et des Patriotes (Pan-African Youth and Pa-
triots Congress or cojep) a group widely known as the Jeunes patriotes (Young 
Patriots),182 the Sanctions Committee for Côte d’Ivoire targeted Mr Blé Goudé 
for the following reasons:
repeated public statements advocating violence against United Nations 
installations and personnel, and against foreigners; direction of and par-
ticipation in acts of violence by street militias, including beatings, rapes 
and extrajudicial killings; intimidation of the United Nations, the Inter-
national Working Group (iwg), the political opposition and indepen-
dent press; sabotage of international radio stations; obstacle to the action 
of the iwg, the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, (unoci), the 
French Forces [present in Côte d’Ivoire to support unoci] and to the 
peace process as defined by resolution 1633 (2005).183
icc Pre-Trial Chamber iii issued a warrant of arrest for Charles Blé Goudé on 
21 December 2011, for his alleged responsibility for the crimes against humanity 
of murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts, and 
persecution.184 To the best of the author’s knowledge, no mention of Mr Blé 
Goudé’s designation by the car Sanctions Committee is made in publicly 
179 icc, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Case No. icc-02/11-3, Request for authorisa-
tion of an investigation pursuant to article 15 (June 23, 2011).
180 icc, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Case No. icc-02/11-14-Corr, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber iii, Corrigendum to “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
 Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire”, 15 
November 2011.
181 unsc, Security Council Committee Concerning Côte d’Ivoire Issues List of Individuals Sub-
ject to Measures Imposed by Resolution 1572 (2004), www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8631.doc 
.htm. The other individuals designated by the Sanctions Committee on this date were 
Eugène Ngoran Kouadio Djué and Martin Kouakou Fofié.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 icc, Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Case No. icc-02/11-02/11-1, Pre-Trial Chamber iii, 
Warrant Of Arrest For Charles Blé Goudé, 21 December 2011, p. 8.
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available documents. Moreover, as with Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui in the drc 
context, the acquittal of Mr Blé Goudé (together with Laurent Gbagbo) by icc 
Trial Chamber i on 15 January 2019185 has not (explicably186) resulted in his 
(nor Mr Gbagbo’s) delisting.
3.2.2.2 Laurent Gbagbo and Simone Gbagbo
It was the unsc itself that added Laurent Gbagbo and Simone Gbagbo to the 
list of sanctioned individuals in Resolution 1975.187 Both were listed for ob-
structing the peace and reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire.188 Mr Gbagbo 
was also targeted for rejecting the results of the 2010 presidential election,189 
while Ms Gbagbo, who served as the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Group 
of the Ivorian Popular Front, the political party co-founded by Mr Gbagbo, was 
also listed for ‘public incitement to hatred and violence’.”190
icc Pre-Trial Chamber iii issued warrants of arrest for Laurent Gbagbo and 
Simone Gbagbo on 23 November 2011191 and 29 February 2012,192 respectively. 
Both warrants included the same four crimes against humanity for which, in 
the judgment of the Pre-Trial Chamber, there were ‘reasonable grounds to be-
lieve’ that Mr Gbagbo and Ms Gbagbo were responsible under the Rome Stat-
ute. These were the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and other forms 
of sexual violence, other inhumane acts, and persecution.193
Paul Bentall argues that the listing of Laurent Gbagbo by the unsc a 
number of months before the Court issued a warrant for his arrest appears 
185 icc, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Case No. icc-02/11-01/15-T-232-
fra, Trial Chamber i, Transcript, 15 January 2019; icc, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, Case No. icc-02/11-01/15-1263, Trial Chamber i, Reasons for oral deci-
sion of 15 January 2019 on the Requête de la Défense de Laurent Gbagbo afin qu’un jugement 
d’acquittement portant sur toutes les charges soit prononcé en faveur de Laurent Gbagbo et 
que sa mise en liberté immédiate soit ordonnée, and on the Blé Goudé Defence no case to 
answer motion, 16 July 2019. The Appeals Chamber is seised of an appeal by the Prosecu-
tor against this decision at the time of writing.
186 See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text.




191 icc, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Case No. icc-02/11-01/11-1, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber iii, Warrant Of Arrest For Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, 23 November 2011.
192 icc, Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo, Case No. icc-02/11-01/12-1, Pre-Trial Chamber iii, War-
rant of Arrest for Simone Gbagbo, 29 February 2012.
193 icc, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Case No. icc-02/11-01/11-1, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber iii, Warrant of Arrest for Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, 23 November 2011, p. 7. Ibid., p. 8.
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‘coincidental’.194 In support of this conclusion, Bentall again195 takes note of 
the mechanism under Article 13 icc Statute pursuant to which the icc was 
seised of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, namely self-referral, observing that 
‘[t]he Court’s jurisdiction was engaged without Security Council involvement, 
with targeted sanctions therefore being used coincidentally alongside’196 icc 
activity focused on the same individuals. According to Bentall, further support 
for this argument can be found in the more than eight months that passed 
between Mr Gbagbo’s listing (3 March 2011) and the issue of a warrant for his 
 arrest (23 November 2011) by the icc.197 Such a conclusion is even stronger in 
the cases of Charles Blé Goudé and Simone Gbagbo, where over five years198 
and a few days short of one year,199 respectively, passed between their desig-
nation at the UN level and the issue of warrants for their arrest by Pre-Trial 
Chamber iii of the Court.
3.2.3 Sudan
The genesis of the (second)200 unsc sanctions regime for Sudan can be found 
in Resolution 1556.201 The first round of sanctions consisted of an arms em-
bargo against ‘all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the 
Janjaweed [militia], operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and 
West Darfur’.202 Responding to the protracted armed conflict in the Darfur re-
gion, the unsc established a sanctions committee and an individual sanctions 
regime, comprising an expanded arms embargo, a travel ban, and asset freez-
ing measures, in Resolution 1591 of 29 March 2005.203 Very shortly thereafter, 
the unsc referred ‘the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002’ to the Prosecutor of 
the icc,204 thereby enabling the Court to exercise jurisdiction with respect to 
international crimes allegedly committed in Darfur pursuant to Article 13(b) of 
194 Bentall, supra note 52, pp. 97–98.
195 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
196 Bentall, supra note 52, p. 97.
197 Ibid., p. 98.
198 The Resolution 1572 Sanctions Committee listed Charles Blé Goudé in February 2006, 
while icc Pre-Trial Chamber iii issued a warrant for his arrest in December 2011.
199 The unsc listed Simone Gbagbo on 3 March 2011, while icc Pre-Trial Chamber iii issued 
a warrant for her arrest on 29 February 2012.
200 S/res/1054 (1996), para. 3 (instituting a sanctions regime in response to Sudan’s failure to 
extradite three individuals suspected of carrying out an assassination attempt against the 
then President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia). See also S/res/1044 
(1996), para. 4. The unsc terminated the sanctions regime in S/res/1372 (2001), para. 1.
201 S/res/1556 (2004), paras. 7–9.
202 Ibid., para. 7.
203 S/res/1591 (2005), para. 3.
204 S/res/1593 (2005), para. 1.
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the Rome Statute.205 unsc Resolution 1672 explicitly named the first four indi-
viduals to be added to the list of targeted persons, but none of these individu-
als was subject to an (unsealed) arrest icc warrant at the time of their listing 
(nor, indeed, have they been since that time).206
The Court has issued arrest warrants for former Sudanese President, Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Omar Al Bashir),207 the former Minister of the Inte-
rior and Special Representative of the President in Darfur, Abdel Raheem 
 Muhammad Hussein,208 alleged Janjaweed leader, Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-
Rahman (Ali Kushayb),209 and a second former Interior Minister, Ahmad Mu-
hammad Harun (Ahmad Harun).210
The icc has also issued summonses to appear, an alternative to an arrest war-
rant issued if the Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied that serving such a document 
is sufficient to ensure the person’s voluntary appearance before the icc,211 for 
three individuals in the situation in Darfur. These are Bahr Idriss Abu Garda,212 
Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus,213 and Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain,214 all 
205 icc Statute, Art. 13(b).
206 S/res/1672 (2006), para. 1 (adding Major General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan (Commander 
of the Western Military Region for the Sudanese Armed Forces, Sheikh Musa Hilal (Para-
mount Chief of the Jalul Tribe in North Darfur), Adam Yacub Shant (Sudanese  Liberation 
Army Commander), and Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri (National Movement for  Reform and 
Development Field Commander) to the list of sanctioned individuals).
207 icc, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), Case No. icc-02/05-
01/09-1, Pre-Trial Chamber i, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 
March 2009; icc, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), Case No. 
icc-02/05-01/09-95, Pre-Trial Chamber i, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ah-
mad Al Bashir, 12 July 2010.
208 icc, Prosecutor v. Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, Case No. icc-02/05-01/12-2, Pre-
Trial Chamber i, Warrant of Arrest for Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, 1 March 2012.
209 icc, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali 
Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), Case No. icc-02/05-01/07-3, Pre-Trial Chamber i, Warrant 
of Arrest for Ali Kushayb, 27 April 2007.
210 icc, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali 
Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), Case No. icc-02/05-01/07-2, Pre-Trial Chamber i, Warrant 
of Arrest for Ahmad Harun, 27 April 2007.
211 icc Statute, Art. 58(7).
212 icc, Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. icc-02/05-02/09-2, Pre-Trial Chamber i, 
Summons to Appear for Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, 7 May 2009.
213 icc, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, 
Case No. icc-02/05-03/09-2-rsc, Pre-Trial Chamber i, Summons to Appear for Saleh 
 Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, 27 August 2009.
214 icc, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, 
Case No. icc-02/05-03/09-3, Pre-Trial Chamber i, Summons to Appear for Abdallah Ban-
da Abakaer Nourain, 27 August 2009.
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of whom were alleged rebel commanders operating in the  Darfur region at the 
time their summonses to appear before the Court were issued.
Sudan might, at first glance, appear to offer an ideal situation in which the 
unsc and the Court could coordinate the asset freezing powers at their dis-
posal. Indeed, the icc Prosecutor noted the potential support available to the 
Court through concerted action by the UN body:
[T]he unsc can act […] to secure the cooperation for the arrest of Ali 
Kushayb and Ahmad Harun. The Prosecution understands that the 
Council can accomplish this under various mechanisms including the 
existing unscr 1591 regime. unscr 1591, para 3(c) provides for applica-
tion of these measures to individuals “who (…) commit violations of in-
ternational humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities.” The 
unscr 1591 regime has already been put into practice through unscr 
1672, which added four names of individuals to be subject to the mea-
sures set out in unscr 1591, namely freezing all funds, other financial 
assets and economic resources owned or controlled by the individuals in 
question. … The means to act are entirely within the unsc’s remit. The 
Prosecution would however urge the unsc to focus first on individual 
measures in relation to Kushayb and Harun, in particular the identifica-
tion and freezing of their assets.215
This said, no such support has materialised, with none of the individuals sub-
ject to icc-issued arrest warrants having been added to the Resolution 1591 
sanctions list at the time of writing, a state of affairs that Beth van Schaack 
accurately labels ‘remarkabl[e]’.216 This is despite the fact that the unsc re-
ferred the situation in Darfur to the icc pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute, the absence of which has been cited as a reason behind the lack of 
coordination between the two bodies in the drc and Côte d’Ivoire contexts.217 
In order to explain this inconsistency, Bentall plausibly suggests that division 
between members of the unsc over referring the situation to the icc might 
have spilled over to its consideration of utilising targeted financial sanctions to 
support Court activity with respect to Sudan, particularly in light of the 
‘[c]ontroversy’ that followed the issuance of warrants of arrest for the then 
215 Eleventh Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to unscr 1593 (2005), www.legal-tools.org/doc/3krzml, paras. 63, 66.
216 Beth Van Schaack. ‘icc Fugitives: The Need for Bespoke Solutions’, in Richard H. Steinberg 
(ed.), Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 
2016) p. 419.
217 See Bentall, supra note 52, p. 97.
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Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir.218 Larissa van den Herik further posits 
that the heated debate219 concerning immunities and States’ obligations to co-
operate with the Court might also have reduced the likelihood of unsc sup-
port for the icc in relation to its activities in Darfur.220 This leads her to the 
conclusion, shared by the present author, that ‘[i]nstead of reinforcing each 
other, in the Darfur situation the Council’s attitude rather undermined icc 
proceedings’.221
But are political considerations the sole factor explaining why further unsc 
support for icc action was not forthcoming in this situation? Van Schaack 
identifies another possible reason: ‘the standards employed to impose sanc-
tions are not co-extensive with the standards employed for issuing an arrest 
warrant. In particular, the former requires a host of bio-identifiers (national 
identity number, proper name, etc.) in order to be effective’.222 However, she 
continues that unsc-appointed sanctions committees have been able to gath-
er the requisite information to add alleged militia leaders to the sanctions list, 
and they ought to be able to do likewise for Sudanese officials against whom 
the icc has issued arrest warrants.223 In a similar vein, Kristen Boon identifies 
the jurisdictional differences between the Court and sanctions committees, 
briefly discussed at the outset of this article,224 as a potential hurdle to broader 
unsc support for icc action, at least in terms of adding individuals subject to 
Court-issued arrest warrants is concerned.225 She therefore advises against the 
automatic cross listing of individuals between the respective regimes.226 Yet, 
Boon continues, with reference to Omar Al Bashir:
218 Ibid., p. 98; see also Mancini, supra note 47, p. 235.
219 For a contemporaneous discussion of this issue, see Paola Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir 
Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?’, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009) 315; Dapo 
Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the icc and its Impact on Al 
Bashir’s Immunities, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009) 333.
220 van den Herik, supra note 82, p. 244.
221 Ibid., p. 245.
222 Van Schaack, supra note 219, p. 419.
223 Ibid.
224 See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
225 Kristen E. Boon, ‘Use the Sanctions Power against Bashir’, Opinio Juris, 20 September 2013, 
www.opiniojuris.org/2013/09/20/use-sanctions-power-bashir/. ‘The jurisdictional thresh-
olds for the icc and the Sanctions Committees are different. The icc proceeds against 
individuals who are alleged to have committed the gravest international crimes. In con-
trast, under Article 41 of the UN Charter, individuals are added to blacklists because they 
violate the terms of existing sanctions and/or contribute to the threat to peace and 
security’.
226 Ibid. This stands in contrast to the authors of the Compendium. Cf. supra notes 83–86 and 
accompanying text.
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but where a head of state has openly flouted a icc warrant, and where he 
independently meets the criteria for inclusion on the travel ban and asset 
freeze, what better opportunity for the Security Council and the icc to 
act together? It would demonstrate coherent policy on peace and secu-
rity issues, and joint condemnation of international crimes.227
Framing such inaction on the part of the unsc in terms of the mutual obliga-
tion to cooperate with the icc explicitly laid out in the icc-UN Relationship 
Agreement, it can hardly be said that support in these circumstances would 
have failed to satisfy the criteria listed therein. On the contrary, the failure on 
the part of the UN body to list any of the individuals against whom the Court 
issued arrest warrants or summonses to appear after having referred the situa-
tion to the icc might even be said to constitute a violation of this (albeit quali-
fied) obligation.
3.2.4 Central African Republic
It was through Resolution 2127 that the unsc established a sanctions regime 
for the Central African Republic (car) by way of response to ‘a total break-
down in law and order’ across the car following the seizure of power by the 
Séléka (Alliance) group of anti-government militias.228 The UN organ imposed 
an arms embargo,229 confirmed its intention to consider imposing measures 
targeting individuals,230 and formed a sanctions committee to, among other 
tasks, monitor the implementation of the arms embargo.231 With the violence 
in the car not having abated, the unsc elected to enact targeted measures, i.e. 
travel bans232 and asset freezes,233 in Resolution 2134 of 28 January 2014. Short-
ly before the anniversary of Resolution 2134, the UN organ renewed and 
 extended the targeted sanctions measures in Resolution 2196.234 Further ex-
tensions were effected in January 2016,235 January 2017,236 and January 2018.237 
227 Ibid.
228 S/res/2127 (2013), preamble.
229 Ibid., para. 54.
230 Ibid., para. 56.
231 Ibid., para. 57.
232 S/res/2134 (2014), para. 30.
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Conspicuously, the unsc explicitly references icc activity in the car in all of 
these resolutions.238 In Resolution 2196, the UN body:
Reiterate[d] that all perpetrators of such acts [e.g. attacks targeting 
peacekeepers] must be held accountable and that some of those acts 
may amount to crimes under the Rome Statute …, to which the car is a 
State party, noting in this regard the opening by the Prosecutor of the 
[icc] on 24 September 2014 of an investigation following the request of 
the national authorities on alleged crimes committed since 2012 and wel-
coming the ongoing cooperation by the car Transitional Authorities in 
this regard[.]239
The car Government has referred two situations on its territory to the icc’s 
Prosecutor. The first self-referral came in December 2004,240 almost a decade 
before the establishment of a UN Security Council sanctions regime for the 
car. A second referral followed on 30 May 2014,241 shortly after the UN body 
adopted sanctions measures targeting individuals. But the car Sanctions 
Committee has not (yet) designated any individuals subjected to an icc arrest 
warrant in the context of either of these situations within the meaning of 
Article 14 of the Rome Statute.242
3.2.4.1 Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (and Others)
It was in the course of investigating the first situation in the car that the Court’s 
Prosecutor successfully applied for a warrant of arrest for Mr Jean-Pierre Bem-
ba Gombo.243 Shortly after the warrant was issued, icc Pre-Trial Chamber iii 
requested the Court’s Registrar to transmit a request for  cooperation to the 
238 S/res/2127 (2013), preamble; S/res/2134 (2014), para. 21; S/res/2196 (2015), preamble; 
S/res/2262 (2016), preamble; S/res/2339 (2017), preamble; ibid., preamble.
239 S/res/2196 (2015), preamble.
240 icc, Situation in the Central African Republic, Case No. icc-01/05-1, Presidency, Decision 
Assigning Situation in the Central African Republic to ptc iii, 19 January 2005, Annex.
241 icc, Situation in the Central African Republic ii, Case No. icc-01/14-1-Anx1, Presidency, 
Decision Assigning the Situation in the Central African Republic ii to ptc ii, 18 June 2014, 
Annex 1.
242 See Michael Ramsden and Tomas Hamilton, ‘Uniting Against Impunity: The UN General 
Assembly as a Catalyst for Action at the icc’, 66 International & Comparative Law Quar-
terly (2017) 893, p. 907.
243 icc, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. icc-01/05-01/08-1-tENG-Corr, Pre-
Trial Chamber iii, Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 23 May 2008. See also 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. icc-01/05-01/08-15-tENG, Pre-Trial 
Chamber iii, Warrant of arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo replacing the warrant of 
arrest issued on 23 May 2008, 10 June 2008.
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Republic of Portugal.244 In its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber requested the 
Portuguese authorities to identify, locate, freeze or seize the property and as-
sets located in Portugal and owned by Mr Bemba, or in which he had a share, 
‘in accordance with the procedures provided for by its national legislation’.245 
Mr Bemba has also submitted that the icc issued similar requests to Belgium 
and the drc,246 but notes that these orders remain confidential ex parte.247
It has been argued that Mr Bemba was never designated on a unsc sanc-
tions list because there was no UN-level sanctions regime focused on the car 
in place at the time the Court issued his warrant of arrest.248 This said, the 
Resolution 2134 Sanctions Committee could have designated Mr Bemba after 
its establishment in January 2014, especially as he had not yet been acquitted 
at that time.249 As to other warrants of arrest issued in the course of the first of 
two situations in the car, these do not concern the commission of the crimes 
listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute,250 but offences against the administra-
tion of justice contrary to Article 70 thereof.251 On 20 November 2013, the 
Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber ii ordered the arrest of Mr Bemba, Aimé Kilolo 
Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Nar-
cisse Arido for presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged and 
for corruptly influencing witnesses.252 In the same arrest warrant, the Pre-Trial 
244 icc, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. icc-01/05-01/08-8, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber iii, Decision et demande en vue d’obtenir l’identification, la localisation, le gel et la 
saisie des biens et avoirs adressées a la Republique Portugaise [Decision and Request to 
the Republic of Portugal for the purpose of obtaining the identification, tracing, freezing 
and seizure of property and assets], 27 May 2008, p. 5.
245 Ibid., p. 4.
246 icc, Situation in the Central African Republic, Case No. icc-01/05-01/08-3663-Red, Public 
Redacted Version of “Urgent request for partial reconsideration and associated orders”, 10 
December 2018), p. 34 (‘The freezing orders were issued on 23 May 2008 (Belgium), 27 May 
2008 (Portugal) and 29 May 2008 (drc)’).
247 Ibid. (appealing that the requests issued to Belgium and the drc be reclassified as public, 
as is the case with the request to Portugal). See supra note 247.
248 See Mancini, supra note 47, p. 234.
249 The Court’s Appeals Chamber acquitted Mr Bemba on 8 June 2018. See icc, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. icc-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, Appeals Chamber, Judg-
ment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber iii’s “Judg-
ment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 8 June 2018. Larissa van den Herik describes 
the failure of the car Sanctions Committee to add Mr Bemba to the list of designated 
individuals as ‘[r]emarkabl[e]’. See van den Herik, supra note 82, p. 246.
250 icc Statute, Art. 5 (the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the 
crime of aggression).
251 icc Statute, Art. 70.
252 icc, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Case No. icc-01/05-01/13-1-Red2-tENG, 
Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo 
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Chamber also ordered the Registrar to prepare requests for cooperation from 
the State(s) effecting the arrest of the named individuals and any other rele-
vant State(s) to locate and freeze their assets.253 It could be contended that 
offences against the administration of justice, as opposed to the ‘most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’,254 are rather 
less likely to attract unsc attention under the targeted sanctions framework. 
This could explain why none of these five individuals has been listed by the 
car Sanctions Committee. From a practical perspective, Marina Mancini also 
observes that all but one of the individuals had been arrested and transferred 
to the icc before Resolution 2134 was adopted.255
3.2.4.2 Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona
The car Sanctions Committee listed Alfred Yekatom, a former officer in the 
Forces Armées Centrafricaines (car armed forces) and alleged leader of a mili-
tia in the anti-Balaka alliance of groups engaged in an armed conflict with 
(ex-)Séléka256 forces, on 20 August 2015.257 The Sanctions Committee listed 
Mr Yekatom pursuant to Resolution 2196, namely for:
engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, sta-
bility or security of the car, including acts that threaten or violate tran-
sitional agreements, or that threaten or impede the political transition 
process, including a transition toward free and fair democratic elections, 
or that fuel violence.258
Although the car Sanctions Committee has not listed Patrice-Edouard Nga-
ïssona, his position as ‘general coordinator of the anti-Balaka’ is mentioned 
Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, 
20 November 2013.
253 Ibid., pp. 15–16.
254 icc Statute, Art. 5.
255 Mancini, supra note 47, p. 234. Narcisse Arido was transferred to the icc on 18 March 2014. 
See icc, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo et al., Case No. icc-01/05-01/13-274, Pre-
Trial Chamber ii, Decision on “Narcisse Arido’s regulation 35 motion to extend time for 
initial appearance to March 24, 2014 to allow attorney, Abbe Jolles, to travel from Washing-
ton DC, USA” dated 18 March 2014, 19 March 2014, p. 3.
256 The then President of the car and former leader of the Séléka, Michel Djotodia, dissolved 
the group by way Presidential Decree on 12 September 2013.
257 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the 
Central African Republic, Alfred Yekatom, www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/
materials/summaries/individual/alfred-yekatom.
258 Ibid.
Downloaded from Brill.com12/04/2020 08:58:30AM
via free access
 1019Coexistent but Uncoordinated
<UN>
international criminal law review 20 (2020) 983-1025
by way of ‘[a]dditional information’ in the listing of Habib Soussou, an al-
leged anti-Balaka zone commander for the town of Boda and the province of 
 Lobaye.259 As for the icc, Pre-Trial Chamber ii has issued arrest warrants for 
both Mr Yekatom260 and Mr Ngaïssona.261 Both warrants of arrest followed 
the listing of Mr Yekatom by the Resolution 2134 Sanctions Committee and, 
while the Pre-Trial Chamber explicitly states that the protracted armed con-
flict in the car had gained the attention of the unsc in issuing a warrant for 
Mr Yekatom’s arrest,262 the latter’s designation by the car Sanctions Commit-
tee is not accorded similar attention.
3.2.4.3 Joseph Kony
An anomaly in the examination of the overlap between the activities of unsc-
established sanctions committees and the icc concerns Joseph Kony, the al-
leged founder and leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (lra), an armed group 
with roots in Uganda but which has since been operational across Central Af-
rica, including in the car.263 The car Sanctions Committee listed Mr Kony 
on 7 March 2016, in accordance with Resolution 2262.264 Among the multiple 
reasons provided for his listing are his involvement in violations of interna-
tional human rights law or international humanitarian law, including the use 
259 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the 
Central African Republic, Habib Soussou, www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/
materials/summaries/individual/habib-soussou. ‘On 28 June 2014, general coordinator of 
the anti-Balaka Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona appointed Habib Soussou as provincial co-
ordinator for the town of Boda since 11 April 2014 and since 28 June 2014 for the entire 
province of Lobaye. Targeted killings, clashes and attacks by anti-Balaka in Boda against 
humanitarian organizations and aid workers have occurred on a weekly basis in areas for 
which Soussou is the anti-Balaka commander or coordinator’.
260 icc, Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom, Case No. icc-01/14-01/18-1-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, 
Public Redacted Version of “Warrant of Arrest for Alfred Yekatom”, icc-01/14-01/18-1-US-
Exp, 11 November 2018, 17 November 2018.
261 icc, Prosecutor v. Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Case No. icc-01/14-01/18-89-Red, Pre-Trial 
Chamber ii, Public Redacted Version of “Warrant of Arrest for Patrice-Edouard Ngaïsso-
na”, 13 December 2018.
262 icc, Prosecutor v. Alfred Yekatom, Case No. icc-01/14-01/18-1-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, 
Public Redacted Version of “Warrant of Arrest for Alfred Yekatom”, icc-01/14-01/18-1-US-
Exp, 11 November 2018, 17 November 2018.
263 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning 
the Central African Republic, Joseph Kony, www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/
materials/summaries/individual/joseph-kony.
264 Ibid. The Sanctions Committee designated the lra on the list of sanctioned entities on 
the same day, ibid.
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of  sexual violence, the targeting of civilians, and the recruitment or use of chil-
dren in armed conflict.265
The reason for categorising Mr Kony’s listing by the Sanctions Committee 
for the car as an anomaly stems from the existence of his pre-existing warrant 
of arrest, issued by the Court in 2005 in the situation in Uganda,266 rather than 
in the course of the (first) situation in the car. The article will return to the 
(justifiable) lack of unsc support for the icc, at least in terms of imposing 
targeted sanctions, in the Uganda situation in Part 3.3.1.
3.2.5 Mali
The unsc established a sanctions regime, comprising, inter alia, a travel ban, 
asset freezing measures, and the creation of a new sanctions committee, for 
Mali in Resolution 2374 of 5 September 2017.267 The UN body decided that co-
ercive action under Chapter vii of the UN Charter was required to respond to 
violations of various ceasefire agreements, not least by terrorist groups operat-
ing on Malian territory. In addition, and of note for the purposes of the present 
article, in the preamble to Resolution 2374, the unsc:
Not[ed] with grave concern the involvement of non-state actors, notably 
terrorist groups, in the destruction of cultural heritage and the trafficking 
in cultural property and related offences and further [took note] of the 
fact that on 27 September 2016 the icc found Mr Al Mahdi guilty of the 
war crime of intentionally directing attacks against religious and histori-
cal monuments in Timbuktu.268
unsc action therefore followed icc activity in the context of the situation in 
Mali. The sanctions remain in force at the time of writing, having been re-
newed on three occasions.269
Turning to icc action in Mali, it was the Malian Government that referred 
the situation on its territory to the Court’s Prosecutor in July 2012.270 It was pur-
suant to this referral that the icc Prosecutor successfully applied for a  warrant 
265 Ibid.
266 icc, Situation in Uganda, Case No. icc-02/04-01/05-53, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Warrant of 
Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005, 27 
 September 2005.
267 S/res/2374 (2017), para. 9.
268 Ibid., preamble.
269 S/res/2432 (2018); S/res/2484 (2019); S/res/2541 (2020).
270 icc, Situation in the Republic of Mali, Case No. icc-01/12-1-Anx1, Presidency, Decision as-
signing the situation in the Republic of Mali to Pre-Trial Chamber ii, 19 July 2012, Annex.
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of arrest for Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi,271 whose conviction in 2016 the unsc 
explicitly references in Resolution 2374. Mr Al Mahdi was an alleged member 
of the Ansar Dine group, a movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb.272 The Prosecutor was also successful in her application for an ar-
rest warrant for another alleged member of Ansar Dine, and de facto chief of 
the Islamic police in Timbuktu, Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag 
Mahmoud,273 in March 2018.
Given that the application for a warrant of arrest for Mr Al Mahdi preceded 
the establishment of the Mali Sanctions Committee, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that he has not been added to the list of sanctioned individuals. As for Mr Has-
san, the situation appears to be less clear-cut. The designation criteria listed in 
Resolution 2374 include individuals believed ‘responsible for or complicit in, 
or having engaged in … [p]lanning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that 
violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law’.274 
The latter could include the war crimes for which the Court’s Pre-Trial Cham-
ber i found ‘reasonable grounds to believe that he is criminally responsible’275 
under the Rome Statute. The same can be said of the former inasmuch as the 
crimes against humanity for which the same Pre-Trial Chamber was satisfied 
to the required standard that Mr Hassan was responsible to issue the warrant 
for his arrest violate international human rights law.276 Again here, a sanctions 
committee created under the auspices of the UN Charter was faced with a 
choice between supporting the Court and not doing so and opted for the latter.
3.3 Neither Coexistent nor Coordinated
3.3.1 Uganda
Uganda was the first State Party to the Rome Statute to refer a situation on its 
territory to the Prosecutor of the icc, with the President of Uganda submitting 
a self-referral in December 2003.277 It was pursuant to this referral that the 
Court’s Prosecutor succeeded in applying for warrants of arrest for Joseph 
271 icc, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Case No. icc-01/12-01/15-1-Red, Pre-Trial 
Chamber i, Mandat d’arrêt à l’encontre d’Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 18 September 2015.
272 Ibid., para. 5.
273 icc, Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, Case No. icc-
01/12-01/18-2-tENG, Pre-Trial Chamber i, Warrant of Arrest for Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz 
Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, 27 March 2018.
274 S/res/2374 (2017), para. 8.
275 Supra note 273, p. 9.
276 Ibid. (listing the crimes against humanity of torture, rape and sexual slavery, persecution 
on religious and gender grounds, and other inhumane acts).
277 icc, Situation in Uganda, Case No. icc-02/04-1, Presidency, Decision Assigning Situation 
in Uganda to ptc ii, 5 July 2004, Annex.
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Kony,278 Vincent Otti,279 Raska Lukwiya,280 Okot Odhiambo,281 and Dominic 
Ongwen.282
The unsc has not established a sanctions committee for Uganda, although 
it could be argued that there is some overlap between the work of the Resolu-
tion 2127 Sanctions Committee, established for the car, and the crimes inves-
tigated by the icc in Uganda. This is because all five individuals for whom the 
Court has issued warrants of arrest in this situation are members of the lra, 
an armed group also designated by the car Sanctions Committee. This is not 
to say, however, that the UN body has ignored the situation. To the contrary, it 
is clear from various resolutions that members of the unsc are concerned 
about events in (northern) Uganda, particularly the activities of the lra.283 
Instead, it could simply be the case that the UN organ decided to respond to 
this situation without imposing targeted sanctions under the auspices of a 
sanctions committee, a reasonable option entirely within its remit. The unsc 
adopted a similar approach with regard to Kenya.
3.3.2 Kenya
The icc Prosecutor initiated an investigation into the situation in Kenya under 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute, which regulates the Prosecutor’s proprio motu 
powers.284 The Prosecutor initiated this process in November 2009 with respect 
to Kenya, sending a letter to the Court’s then President to inform the Presiden-
cy of his intention to request the authorisation of an investigation pursuant to 
the Article 15 framework.285 A formal request followed shortly thereafter.286 
278 icc, Situation in Uganda, Case No. icc-02/04-01/05-53, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Warrant of 
Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005, 27 Sep-
tember 2005.
279 icc, Situation in Uganda, Case No. icc-02/04-01/05-54, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Warrant of 
Arrest for Vincent Otti, 8 July 2005.
280 icc, Situation in Uganda, Case No. icc-02/04-01/05-55, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Warrant 
of Arrest for Raska Lukwiya, 8 July 2005.
281 icc, Situation in Uganda, Case No. icc-02/04-01/05-56, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Warrant of 
Arrest for Okot Odhiambo, 8 July 2005.
282 icc, Situation in Uganda, Case No. icc-02/04-01/05-57, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Warrant 
of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen, 8 July 2005.
283 See, e.g., S/res/1653 (2006), preamble.
284 icc Statute, Art. 15.
285 icc, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. icc-01/09-1, Presidency, Decision Assign-
ing the Situation in the Republic of Kenya to Pre-Trial Chamber ii, 6 November 2009, 
Annex.
286 icc, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. icc-01/09-3, Request for authorisation of 
an investigation pursuant to Article 15, 26 November 2009.
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After Pre-Trial Chamber ii authorised the Prosecutor’s investigation,287 he was 
successful in applications for summonses to appear for William Samoei Ruto, 
Henry Kiprono Kosgey, and Joshua Arap Sang,288 and Francis Kirimi Muth-
aura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali.289 The same Pre-
Trial Chamber subsequently issued warrants for the arrest of a further three 
individuals in connection with the alleged commission of crimes under the 
icc’s jurisdiction in Kenya, namely Walter Osapiri Barasa,290 Paul Gicheru,291 
and Philip Kipkoech Bett,292 following applications to this end by the second 
icc Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda. As far as the assets of the accused were con-
cerned, less than one month after issuing summonses for the individuals’ ap-
pearance, Pre-Trial Chamber ii instructed the Registrar of the Court ‘to prepare 
and transmit … in consultation with the Prosecutor, a request for cooperation 
to the competent authorities of the Republic of Kenya’ with the declared aim 
of identifying, tracing, and freezing and/or seizing property and assets owned 
by Mr Muthaura, Mr Kenyatta, and Mr Ali (or under their control) ‘without 
prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties’.293
The unsc did not establish a sanctions committee by way of response to 
the post-election violence in Kenya, though the body’s President did issue a 
statement expressing concern at the situation in February 2008.294 The lack 
287 icc, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. icc-01/09-19-Corr, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, 
Corrigendum of the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authoriza-
tion of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 30 March 2011.
288 icc, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Case 
No. icc-01/09-01/11-1, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for 
Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap 
Sang, 8 March 2011, para. 59.
289 icc, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hus-
sein Ali, Case No. icc-01/09-02/11-01, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai 
 Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 8 March 2011, para. 57.
290 icc, Prosecutor v. Walter Osapiri Barasa, Case No. icc-01/09-01/13-1-Red2, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber ii, Warrant of arrest for Walter Osapiri Barasa, 2 August 2013.
291 icc, Prosecutor v. Paul Gicheru and Philip Kipkoech Bett, Case No. icc-01/09-01/15-1-Red, 
Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application under Article 58(1) of 
the Rome Statute”, 10 March 2015.
292 Ibid.
293 icc, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hus-
sein Ali, Case No. icc-01/09-02/11-42, Pre-Trial Chamber ii, Decision Ordering the Regis-
trar to Prepare and Transmit a Request for Cooperation to the Republic of Kenya for the 
Purpose of Securing the Identification, Tracing and Freezing or Seizure of Property and 
Assets of Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 
5 April 2011, p. 5.
294 Statement by the President of the Security Council (UN Doc S/prst/2008/4).
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of  subsequent action could perhaps be attributed (in part) to the fact that the 
UN body did not refer the situation to the icc pursuant to the Article 13(b) icc 
Statute mechanism. Indeed, divisions among the membership of the unsc 
over icc action in Kenya are clear from the results of a 2013 vote on defer-
ring the investigation by the Court’s Prosecutor into crimes allegedly commit-
ted by Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute.295
4 Conclusion
The icc-UN Relationship Agreement envisages the icc and the unsc enjoying 
‘a mutually beneficial relationship’ to better enable the discharge of their re-
spective responsibilities.296 In practice, the UN body has requested the execu-
tion of asset freezing measures in a number of situations in which the icc has 
also been engaged. Yet, as this article has demonstrated, there is scant evidence 
of the two bodies acting in concert. It is this absence of ‘coordinated’ action 
that leads the present author to conclude that to expect close, formalised co-
operation between the unsc and the icc in this sphere of their respective 
(albeit related) operations, as foreseen in the mutual obligation to cooperate 
by which both bodies are bound, is unrealistic.
On the tenth anniversary of the icc-UN Relationship Agreement, the UN 
Secretary-General and the President of the Court issued a joint statement in 
which they observed, inter alia, that ‘[t]he Relationship Agreement has pro-
vided a solid basis for cooperation between the United Nations and the Inter-
national Criminal Court in a wide range of fields’.297 But the analysis in the 
foregoing paragraphs demonstrates that such cooperation rarely extends to 
support for the Court by unsc-established sanctions committees. Only in 
 response to the situation in Libya can, what could be termed ‘coordinated’ 
(or ‘harmonious’)298 action, be observed on this front. Elsewhere, such support 
295 UN scor, 68th session, 7060th meeting (UN Doc S/pv.7060) (seven members voted in 
favour of the draft resolution, with eight abstaining).
296 icc-UN Relationship Agreement, preamble. See also icc-UN Relationship Agreement, 
Art. 3.
297 The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the International Crim-
inal Court, ‘Joint statement on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Relationship 
Agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court’, www.le-
gal-tools.org/doc/6s6ojf/. The statement continues: ‘We are fully committed to strength-
ening the partnership between our two organizations, which is indispensable for a strong 
international community and the protection of the interests of humanity’.
298 van den Herik, supra note 82, p. 244.
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has been coincidental and, as a result, piecemeal. This is despite the potential 
benefits of such support, especially for the icc’s (reparations) procedures.
This article has not sought to argue that the unsc ought to appoint a sanc-
tions committee for every situation in which the icc is operating. Nor has it 
explicitly proposed that the UN organ ought to automatically add all individu-
als against whom the Court has issued an arrest warrant to sanctions lists, 
though the merits of following such an approach are discussed. Instead, the 
article makes the argument, based on an analysis of eight concrete scenarios in 
which the two bodies (could) have coordinated the exercise of their asset 
freezing procedures, for tempering expectations of the unsc as far as its sup-
port for the Court is concerned. Initial prognoses of the UN body playing an 
active role in backing the icc are simply not borne out in practice.299
299 The author wishes to thank Göran Sluiter, Denis Abels, Mohamed Badar, and the anony-
mous peer reviewer for their feedback on earlier drafts of this article.
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